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CHILD CUSTODY -MODIFICATION:
PARENTIFICATION OF AN OLDER SIBLING BABYSITTING
A YOUNGER SIBLING
Mayo v. Mayo, 2000 ND 204, 619 N.W.2d 631
I. FACTS
Pamela Mayo Banjac (Banjac) and William Mayo (Mayo) divorced in
1995.1 Banjac gained primary custody of their three minor children:
Garnet, Caitlin, and Nicholas. 2 Four years later, Mayo moved for a change
of custody based on the alleged deterioration of Banjac's physical, mental,
and financial conditions. 3
The parties agreed that Dr. Rick P. Ascano, a licensed clinical
psychologist, would conduct a parental capacity psychological evaluation
and testify as a neutral expert witness as to his findings regarding custody
modification. 4 Dr. Ascano reported Banjac suffered from fibromyalgia5 and
1. Brief for Appellant at 4, Mayo v. Mayo, 2000 ND 204, 619 N.W.2d 631 (No. 20000032).
Banjac and Mayo were married on April 24, 1982, and divorced on October 5, 1995. Id.
2. Mayo v. Mayo, 2000 ND 204, 2, 619 N.W.2d 631, 633; see also Appellant's Brief at 4,
Mayo (No. 20000032). At the time of the divorce and afterward, both parties lived in Wahpeton,
North Dakota. Appellant's Brief at 4, Mayo (No. 20000032). Banjac was a homemaker, and
Mayo was a doctor. Id. Mayo stipulated that custody of the children be given to Banjac in the
divorce despite being aware of Banjac's medical problems, which included fibromyalgia and
migraine headaches. Mayo, 2, 55, 619 N.W.2d at 633, 643.
3. Mayo, 2, 619 N.W.2d at 633; see also Appellant's Brief at 4-5, Mayo (No. 20000032).
Banjac went to Bismarck to visit her father on March 5, 1999, and she married Dr. Boris Banjac,
on March 6, 1999, in Bismarck. Appellant's Brief at 4, Mayo (No. 20000032). Banjac planned to
relocate to Sauk Rapids, Minnesota, which is located one mile from St. Cloud, Minnesota, and is
within the 150-mile radius of Wahpeton, North Dakota, stipulated to in Banjac and Mayo's
divorce decree. Id. 0 n March 5, 1999, Mayo's attorney served Banjac with the motion for
change of custody. Id. Mayo alleged Banjac's migraines and fibromyalgia constituted a
deterioration of her physical and mental condition even though Banjac's health had actually
improved with medication since the divorce. Mayo, 55, 619 N.W.2d at 643 (Maring, J.,
dissenting).
4. Mayo, 3, 619 N.w.2d at 633. Dr. Rick P. Ascano is a clinical psychologist who has
regularly testified as an expert witness in custody cases since 1984. Brief for Appellee at 25,
Mayo v. Mayo, 2000 ND 204, 619 N.W.2d 631 (No. 20000032). Dr. Ascano has specialized
training in custody issues and has a board certification in child custody evaluation procedure. Id.
Dr. Ascano's practice is called R. P. Ascano, Ph.D. & Associates, Forensic Consultation &
Psychotherapy, and is located in Breckenridge, Minnesota. Transcript of Proceedings on Aug. 10,
1999 at 169, Mayo (No. 20000032). Dr. Ascano's fee of $1800 was to be fully paid by Mayo.
Appellant's Brief at 5, Mayo (No. 20000032).
5. Fibromyalgia is the chronic inflammation of a muscle, ligament, or tendon (the fibrous
tissues in the body) with an overgrowth of the connective tissue, which causes pain in the
surrounding fibrous tissues. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 649 (26th ed. 1995)
(defining fibromyositis, which is also known as fibromyalgia); see also Fibromyalgia, available at
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migraine headaches, causing her to lie down for one hour at least once a
month while Garnet, age fourteen, watched the younger children, ages
eleven and six. 6 Dr. Ascano concluded that this unexpected babysitting of
her younger siblings resulted in Garnet's parentification. 7
Parentification "refers to a child assuming adult responsibilities and
acting as a care provider for younger siblings."8 Parentification affects a
child by forcing the child to be more responsible than is age appropriate,
creating other psychological difficulties, and resulting in the child having
difficulties forming bonds with peers as an adult.9
Dr. Ascano testified as to the effects of parentification in light of the
statutory best interest factors.0 He reported that the children were equally
bonded to both parents and that both parents had average parenting
abilities." Dr. Ascano recommended that if the court decided to change
custody to Mayo, "Mayo should undergo individual therapy to help him
http://health.yahoo.com (last visited Nov. 11, 2002) (listing alternative names for fibromyalgia,
one being fibromyositis) [hereinafter Fibromyalgia on yahoo]; Fibromyalgia Network, available
at http://www.fmnetnews.com (last visited Nov. 11, 2002) (defining fibromyalgia) [hereinafter
Fibromyalgia Network]. Approximately three to six million Americans suffer from fibromyalgia
according to the American College of Rheumatology, with the primary sufferers being women of
childbearing age. Fibrornyalgia, available at http://nih.gov/niams/healthinfo/fibrofs.htm (last
visited Nov. 11, 2002) [hereinafter Fibromyalgia on nih]. The cause of the disorder is unknown,
but can be linked to physical or emotional trauma. See Fibromyalgia on yahoo supra. There is no
proven cure, but treatment includes education, physical therapy, and counseling coupled with low-
dose anti-depressants or anti-inflammatory drugs. See id. (noting that symptoms may come and
go over months or years). Symptoms include pain, fatigue, sleep disorder, chronic headaches, and
sensitivities to odors, noise, bright lights, and various foods and medications. Fibromyalgia
Network supra. Fibromyalgia is chronic, but its symptoms wax and wane. Id.
6. Mayo, 4,619 N.W.2d at 633-34.
7. Id. at 634. Parentification is not a diagnosis in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (4th ed. 1994), but is a construct developed by psychologists, which has various
definitions and effects depending upon the expert. Id. 18, 619 N.W.2d at 636. Parentification is
not a diagnosis, but is a descriptive term. Interview with Val Farmer, psychologist, MeritCare,
Fargo, North Dakota. (Aug. 10, 2001) [hereinafter Farmer]. Parentification is more than just
babysitting, it is when an older sibling adopts a disciplinary or caretaker role with the younger
sibling even when the parent is present, and can occur with or without the parent's support. Id.
8. Mayo, 4, 619 N.W.2d at 633-34.
9. Id. 7, 619 N.W.2d at 634.
10. Id. 5. The statutory best interest factors are found in section 14-09-06.2(1) of the North
Dakota Century Code. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1) (2000). The considerations used to
determine the best interest of a child include the following: the emotional connection between
parent and child; the ability of the parent to love and guide the child; the ability of the parent to
provide food, clothing, and shelter; the length of time the child has lived with the parent in a
nurturing environment; stability; moral fitness of the parent; mental and physical health of the
parent; the home, school and community; the child's preference; any incidence of domestic
violence; the parent-child relationship in the home; whether any falge allegations which harm the
child were made; and any other factors the court deems to be relevant to the particular dispute.
See id. (listing the criteria the court uses to determine a child's best interest); see also Mayo, 26,
619 N.W.2d at 637 (stating the trial court must use the best interest factors set forth in section 14-
09-06.2).
11. Mayo, 5,619 N.W.2d at 634.
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manage conflicts and stress and should participate in family parenting
therapy."' 2 However, if the court decided to leave custody with Banjac, Dr.
Ascano concluded that "a guardian ad litem should be appointed to evaluate
Banjac's ability to parent considering her chronic pain, and the children
should become involved in step-family therapy followed by blended-family
therapy to facilitate the adjustment of all the family members into one
unit." 13
Dr. Ascano testified that the oldest child was likely to endure sig-
nificant psychological harm if Banjac remained the custodial parent.14 He
further testified that counseling and hiring a nanny could eliminate paren-
tification even if Banjac retained custody of the oldest child.15 However,
this backup childcare needed to be available at all times in order to stop the
parentification process and alleviate the oldest child's anxiety caused by not
knowing when she may have to care for her younger siblings. 16 Dr. Ascano
testified that the oldest child was experiencing anticipatory anxiety because
she did not know when she would need to babysit her younger siblings. 17
Dr. Ascano stated that if the child lived with Mayo, the child would not
endure any psychological harm because she would not be anxious about
having to care for her younger siblings, and thus, she would not be subject
to parentification. 18
12. Id. 6. Family therapy is therapy in which a family in conflict meets as a group with the
therapist and explores the family relationship and process. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY
1441 (26th ed. 1995). Because Mayo is the parent, his family counseling would be family
parenting therapy and would help him deal with parenting issues. Id. Individual therapy, also
known as dyadic psychotherapy, involves only the patient and therapist, is based primarily on
communications with the patient, and addresses emotional, behavioral, and personality disorders.
Id. at 1167, 1441.
13. Mayo, 6, 619 N.W.2d at 634. Step-family therapy is used to work on family dynamics,
or interaction when a stepparent is brought into a family, and helps to define the roles of each
family member. Telephone Interview with John Tyler, Ph.D. ABPP, Family Institute PC (Aug. 2,
2001) [hereinafter Tyler]. Blended-family therapy is used to help two individual parents with
children merge into a single-family unit, usually after the marriage of the two parents. Id. In this
case, both Dr. Banjac and Pamela Banjac had children from a previous marriage. Brief for
Appellant at 8, Mayo v. Mayo, 2000 ND 204, 619 N.W.2d 631 (No. 20000032).
14. Mayo, 7, 619 N.W.2d at 634.
15. Id. The nanny would have to be available twenty-four hours a day to eliminate the
parentification. Id.
16. Id.
17. Appellant's Brief at 9, Mayo (No. 20000032). Anticipatory anxiety is the fear that a
future event may happen. Tyler, supra note 13. It is harmful to the child because of the fear and
worry associated with wondering when she will next be left alone to care for her siblings. MARK
H. BEERS & ROBERT BERKOW, THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 1512-13
(17th ed. 1999).
18. Mayo, 7, 619 N.W.2d at 634.
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According to Dr. Ascano, the easiest way to halt the parentification
process was to change custody.19 He recommended such a change of cus-
tody based on the combination of Banjac's health problems and Mayo's
recognition of his need to decrease his working hours.20 The trial court
temporarily remanded custody to Mayo. 2' However, Banjac was given four
days to obtain a childcare provider and to provide a plan approved by Dr.
Ascano to eliminate the oldest child's parentification if she desired to regain
custody of the children. 22
Instead of finding a childcare provider, Banjac obtained a second
opinion that rebutted the finding of parentification by Dr. Ascano. 23 Banjac
retained Dr. Thomas Will, a clinical psychologist, and Mayo retained his
own clinical psychologist, Dr. Stephen Timm. 24 After hearing from the par-
ties, their experts, and Dr. Ascano, the trial court granted Mayo's motion
for a change in custody because of Banjac's inability to care for the children
and the potential harm to the oldest child through parentification. 25 Banjac
appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court, which held that: (1) parenti-
fication constitutes a material change in circumstances, 26 (2) parentification
outweighs the custodial stability factor in regard to the best interests of the
children, 27 (3) the trial court did not have to exhaust all other remedies
before changing custody, 28 and (4) the trial court did not err in finding a
substantial change in circumstances requiring a change of custody that was
in the best interest of the children. 29
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders does not list
parentification as a diagnosis, instead, it is considered a "construct" that has
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. 8,619 N.W.2d at 634-35.
22. Id.
23. Id. 52, 619 N.W.2d at 642 (Maring, J., dissenting).
24. Id. 10-11,619 N.W.2d at 635. Dr. Stephen Timm is a licensed self-employed clinical
psychologist in Fargo, North Dakota. Transcript of Proceedings on Dec. 16, 1999, at 331, Mayo
v. Mayo, 2000 ND 204, 619 N.W.2d 631 (No. 20000032). He has been in private practice since
1978 and is on the National Register of Health Service Providers in Psychology. Id. Dr. Thomas
Will is a licensed clinical psychologist in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and is employed by Gary
Fischler and Associates and the Institute for Forensic Psychology. Id. at 211. Dr. Will has done
previous custody evaluations for divorce and custody cases. Id. at 212.
25. Mayo v. Mayo, 2000 ND 204, 12, 619 N.W.2d 631, 635.
26. Id. 25,619 N.W.2d at 637.
27. Id. 30, 619 N.W.2d at 638.
28. Id. 32.
29. Id. 38, 619 N.W.2d at 639.
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been developed by psychologists and given significantly different defini-
tions.30 This parentification construct has been addressed by several state
courts in regard to decisions involving child custody, 31 termination of
parental rights,32 and intervention in abuse and neglect proceedings. 33 A
court may use parentification testimony in one of three ways: it may not
address parentification in deciding the case, 34 it may use parentification
testimony as one of many factors, 35 or it may decide the case using
30. Id. 18, 619 N.W.2d at 636; see generally DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994). A construct is an invention or fabrication. WEST'S LEGAL
THESAURUSIDICTIONARY 178 (1985). Parentification is cited in sexual abuse literature in regard
to role imbalance, and in family therapy related research. See generally CAVNET, available at
http://www.calib.com (last visited Nov. I1, 2002) (searching for the term "parentification" will
locate many articles that describe it).
Many substance-abusing parents also recount histories of growing up in households in
which there was a blurring of boundaries between parental and child roles. As young
children, such parents often assumed primary responsibility for taking care of house-
hold and family needs. Although it may have filled a void or a need within the family,
this role reversal may have also seriously interfered with the parent's timely acquisi-
tion of age-appropriate life skills and experiences. Thus, as adults, such individuals
often have an impaired ability to form truly mutual adult relationships and a healthy
self-concept that are prerequisites to successful parenting.
CAVNET, Characteri.stics of Parents at Risk, available at http://www.calib.com (last modified
May 30, 2002). Dr. Val Farmer, a psychologist in Fargo, North Dakota, defined parentification
not as a diagnosis, but as a descriptive term that refers to an older sibling going beyond baby-
sitting by taking on a parental disciplinary role with a younger sibling, with or without parental
support. Farmer, supra note 7.
31. See Myers v. Myers, 14 Phila. Co. Rptr. 224, 235 (Pa. Com. P1. 1986) (hearing expert
testimony in regard to parentification in a child placement proceeding); see also Cloutier v.
Lear, 691 A.2d 660, 662 (Me. 1997) (deciding a motion to modify custody based on testimony
about the adult-to-adult relationship between a parent and child, which resulted in unhealthy
parentification).
32. See In re Tabitha T., 722 A.2d 1232, 1234 (Conn. App. 1999) (listing parentification as
one of many physical, sexual, and mental traumas present in a termination of parental rights hear-
ing); see also In re Nelson T., 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 668, at *1, *26-*27 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Mar. 15, 1999) (noting that in a termination of parental rights case, the oldest of six children, age
eight at the time, was parentified and tried to care for his younger siblings and mother); In re
Michael N., 1998 Conn. Super. LEXIS 991, at *2, *13 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 13, 1998) (noting
that a therapist identified many issues common to older children, including parentification, present
in the oldest child in a termination of parental rights hearing).
33. See In re Michael Ray T., 525 S.E.2d 315, 319 (W.Va. 1999) (listing parentification
among the many abuses and neglect suffered by a five-year-old while in the parents' care).
34. See Myers, 14 Phila. Co. Rptr. at 235, 254 (stating as uncontradicted testimony that the
mother was a loving, caring parent who placed the children's needs first despite Dr. Lewis' testi-
mony about the oldest child being parentified while in the care of the mother and not the father);
see also In re Michael Ray T., 525 S.E.2d at 319, 321 (stating the five-year-old child, the oldest of
three children, exhibited unhealthy parentification when entering foster care, however, parentifi-
cation did not apply to the issue before the court, which was whether to allow the foster parents to
intervene in the abuse and neglect hearings in which the foster children and their biological
parents were involved); In re Michael N., 1998 Conn. Super. LEXIS 991, at * 13, *23-*27 (listing
seven findings of the court, but not mentioning the parentification testified to by Dr. Berkowitz).
35. See Cloutier, 691 A.2d at 664 (holding the adult-to-adult relationship between mother
and daughter resulted in the child's involvement in the conflict between the parents); see also In
re Tabitha T., 722 A.2d at 1234, 1237 (finding harm to the children as a result of the parents' acts,
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parentification as the determinative factor.36 In Maine and Pennsylvania,
the courts have used parentification as one of many factors in deciding the
best interests of the children.37
A. CLOUTIER V. LEAR: USING PARENTIFICATION AS ONE OF MANY
REASONS TO CHANGE CUSTODY
In Cloutier v. Lear,38 the Supreme Court of Maine upheld the modify-
cation of a three-year-old divorce judgment providing the mother with
primary custody of the parties' two minor children. 39 The court considered
whether there had been a substantial change in circumstances and whether
modification was in the best interests of the children in determining whether
a modification of the custody arrangement was justified.40
The trial court found that the mother failed to comply with a number of
court orders, denigrated the father to his children, frustrated contact
between the father and the children, and interfered with the father's parent-
child relationship.4 1 The court also found that the children suffered "sig-
nificant emotional problems because of the strife." 42 A therapist who spent
time with the children testified that the mother had an adult-to-adult rela-
tionship with the older child.43 This made the child want to protect her
mother, and thus, she became involved in the parents' discourse.an The
child strongly identified with the strife between the parents, and this caused
parentification. 45 Hence, the child became emotionally distraught and felt
her mother was emotionally controlling her in an unhealthy and manipula-
tive manner.a6
The trial court found that "the best interest of the child requires
developing the best possible relationship with both parents." 47  After
which included sexual abuse, physical abuse, and parentification); In re Nelson T., 1999 Conn.
Super. LEXIS 668, at *38-*41 (listing parentification as one of many detriments to the children in
the court's decision to terminate parental rights).
36. See Mayo v. Mayo, 2000 ND 204, 30, 619 N.W.2d 631, 638 (holding the trial court did
not err in finding the danger of damage due to parentification outweighed the stability of not
removing the children from their home).
37. Cloutier, 691 A.2d at 664; Myers, 14 Phila. Co. Rptr. at 235.
38. 691 A.2d 660 (Me. 1997).
39. Cloutier, 691 A.2d at 661. The daughter was twelve and the son was eight when the case
was tried. Id.
40. Id. at 662.
41. Id. at 662-63.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 662.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 663 (quoting Sheldon v. Sheldon, 423 A.2d 943, 946 (Me. 1980)).
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considering all factors, the court upheld the trial court's decision to change
custody of the children to the father, stating that continued exposure to the
mother's conduct would impair or destroy the children's relationship with
their father.48 Thus, parentification was one of several factors, including
parental alienation, used to decide that a change in custody was in the best
interests of the children.4 9
B. MYERS V. MYERS: CONSIDERING PARENTIFICATION, BUT FINDING
IT UNNECESSARY TO CHANGE CUSTODY
In Myers v. Myers,SO the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas
found that it was in the best interests of the two children, ages eleven and
ten, to remain with their mother, the custodial parent.5' The court made this
decision despite a psychologist's evaluation that the older child was parenti-
fied and playing the role of the parent to her younger sibling while in the
presence of their mother, but not in the presence of their father.52 At the
time of trial, the children had lived with their mother for five years. 53
Dr. Kenneth Lewis, a custody specialist who performs comparative
studies in child custody cases, testified at trial as an expert witness.54 Dr.
Lewis stated that the older child was parentified, essentially playing the role
of the parent for her younger brother.55 Dr. Lewis also testified that when
the children were with their father and stepmother, parentification was not
visible.56 However, Dr. Lewis had not done a comparative study because
she resided out-of-state, and visiting both biological parents was not
possible.57
In addition to Dr. Lewis, the father hired a psychologist, Dr. Jessica
Lippman, to evaluate the children.58 Dr. Lippman could not make a com-
parative recommendation because she did not interview the mother, and
48. Id. at 664.
49. Id. at 662-63. Parental alienation is the frustration or intentional interference of a
parent's attempt to exercise visitation and the alienation of the child from the visiting parent.
Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 1999 ND 37, 8, 590 N.W.2d 220, 223.
50. 14 Phila. Co. Rptr. 224 (Pa. Com. P1. 1986).
51. Myers, 14 Phila. Co. Rptr. at 266.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 226, 228. The parents separated five years prior to this litigation and divorced three
years prior to the litigation. Id. at 226.
54. Id. at 234. "Comparative studies" is a broad term used to describe a study in which two
or more options are studied in order to determine the best alternative. Tyler, supra note 13.
55. Myers, 14 Phila. Co. Rptr. at 235.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 234-35.
58. Id. at 236.
2002]
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thus, testified only to the fitness of the father.59 Dr. Lippman recommended
that the older child should live with her father in Chicago and that both
children needed to remain in counseling regardless of the court's placement
decision.60
Dr. Schechter, a board certified child psychiatrist who testified on be-
half of the child advocate, did a comparative child custody study.61 He
testified that both parents desired for the children to have a relationship
with their mother and father.62 Dr. Schechter concluded that the children
should be separated.63 He further added the older child should be with her
father and the younger child with his mother so they would not have the
"constant source of friction from each other as well as the source of friction
from the parents." 64
Dr. Schwartz, a clinical psychologist and director of Montgomery
County Guidance Clinic, testified as an expert on behalf of the mother. 65
Dr. Schwartz found that when the younger child was subjected to the pres-
sure of the custody dispute, caused by the father's questions regarding
where the child wanted to live and if things were "okay" at his mother's
home, the child became tense and anxious.66 The older child was similarly
being pressured by her father to choose him over her mother.67 This caused
her anxiety because if she chose her mother, she would have risked aliena-
ting her father completely. 68 Dr. Schwartz determined that there was no
justification to warrant a change in custody with regard to either child.69
The court considered each expert's testimony in light of the facts and
circumstances of the case.70 It noted that Dr. Lewis was an expert in com-
parative child custody studies, yet he did not do a comparative study.71 Dr.
Lippman recommended that the older child live with her father, but the
court did not give Dr. Lippman's opinion any weight regarding custody
59. Id. at 238.
60. Id. at 237-38.
61. Id. at 242; see also comparative studies defined supra note 54.
62. Myers v. Myers, 14 Phila. Co. Rptr. 224, 242 (Pa. Com. P1. 1986).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 243.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 244.
68. Id. The oldest child felt that she had the emotional support of her mother even if she
chose to live with her father, but if she chose to live with her mother, she felt she would lose the
emotional support of her father. Id.
69. Id. at 246.
70. Id. at 251-52.
71. Id. at 252.
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because she never interviewed the mother, never saw how the children
interacted with their mother, and never saw their home environment. 72
The court weighed the expert testimony with the "uncontradicted testi-
mony" that the mother was a good and loving parent who placed the
children's needs above her own.73 The court concluded that the father did
not establish a substantial change in circumstances.74
In regard to the best interests of the children, the court found both
parents to be fit; therefore, it weighed the best interest factors to determine
the best placement for the children. 75 The children had always lived with
their mother, their primary caregiver. 76 The mother had an active and open
relationship with the children. 77 With their mother, the children had their
own rooms, many friends at school, a safe environment to play, and several
relatives nearby. 78
Although both parents were fit, the court balanced the best interest
factors and decided the father did not have as many advantages as the
mother to offer the children. 79 The father defied the previous court order
stipulated to by the parties and refused to return the children to their mother
after his summer visitation.80 He enrolled the children in school and had
them psychologically evaluated in preparation for the custody motion he
later filed.81 Furthermore, he pressured the children in an attempt to obtain
information about their mother and home life that he could use against her
in the court case. 82 This pressure caused the children emotional stress and
fear associated with having to choose loyalties between their parents. 83
72. Id. at 252-53. Stephen Herman, M.D., associate clinical professor of psychiatry at Mount
Sinai School of Medicine in New York, strongly urges psychiatrists to turn away requests for
unilateral child custody evaluations which involve seeing only one parent with a child. Custody
Cases Can Blur Line Between Therapy and Advocacy, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, Dec. 18, 1998,
available at http://www.psych.org. Herman stated:
[Unilateral child custody evaluations] lack credibility because you are getting only one
side of the story. In addition, the lawyer may use you for this case because he or she is
interested in winning and knows you can be bought. So it isn't worth it; it's a
disservice to you, the profession, and to desperate families.
Id.
73. Myers v. Myers, 14 Phila. Co. Rptr. 224, 254 (Pa. Com. P1. 1986).
74. Id. at 255.
75. Id. at 256.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 256-57.
80. Id. at 258.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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The court concluded that the majority of the friction between the chil-
dren was due to this custody dispute.84 Because the friction would likely
disappear when the case was settled, there was no reason to separate the
siblings.85 The court stated, "If psychiatrists and psychologists knew how
to achieve a child's best interest, deciding child custody cases would be
comparable to diagnosing and treating a known medical condition. But
psychiatrists and psychologists don't know-as the record of their disagree-
ment in this case amply demonstrates." 86 The court determined that it was
the final decision-maker regarding the best interests of the children and that
its decision must be made after exploring and developing all the pertinent
facts and circumstances in the case.87 Therefore, the court concluded that
the best interests of the children required that they live with their mother
and that she retain physical custody of both children, despite the
psychologists' opinions regarding parentification.88
Like in Maine and Pennsylvania, post-custody modification in North
Dakota requires a material or substantial change in circumstances since the
last court order. 89 North Dakota also requires that the change in custody is
in the best interest of the child.90
C. THE BEST INTEREST FACTORS IN NORTH DAKOTA
In 1973, North Dakota courts began using the best interest of the child
factors when determining child custody issues. 91 In 1979, the common law
best interest factors were codified and have since been amended by adding
three more factors. 92 Since its codification, North Dakota courts have
84. Id. at 265.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 265-66.
87. Id. at 266.
88. Id.
89. Holtz v. Holtz, 1999 ND 105, 9, 595 N.W.2d 1, 4. A material change is a significant
change that has occurred since the original custody order that requires the court to change custody
to serve the best interest of the child. Id. 10. It can occur if the child's current environment may
endanger the child's physical health, emotional health, or emotional development. Id. 17, 595
N.W.2d at 6.
90. Id. 9, 595 N.W.2d at 4.
91. Odegard v. Odegard, 259 N.W.2d 484,486 (N.D. 1977).
92. Kathleene B. Garner, Infants-Parent and Child: Applying the Rebuttable Presumption
Against Awarding Custody to Perpetrators of Domestic Violence, 72 N.D. L. REV. 155, 156-57
(1996). The three factors most recently added were factor j, evidence of domestic violence; factor
k, the interaction and interrelationship, or the potential for interaction and interrelationship, of the
child with any person who resides in, is present, or frequents the household of a parent and who
may significantly affect the child's best interests; and factor 1, the making of false allegations by
one parent against the other. Id. at 156; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1) (2000) (listing
the statutory best interest factors).
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consistently based child custody determinations on the statutory best
interest factors.93
When determining placement of a child, it is not only the fact that a
difference exists in the parents regarding one or more of the statutory best
interest factors, but that the difference might adversely affect the parent's
ability to care for the child.94 Both parents can be good and fit parents. 95 In
a close decision between two nearly equal parents, the best interest factors
are used to favor one parent over another in determining a child's physical
placement. 96 The factors are considered by the court in light of the effect
they have on the parent's ability to care for the child.97 The court is not
required to make a separate finding of fact on each factor, but the factors it
uses should be explained in its opinion.98
Thus, section 14-09-06.6(6), which requires a material change in cir-
cumstances and that the modification of custody be in the best interest of
the children, must be considered in light of the children involved in the
custody dispute.99 The material change in circumstances must have arisen
since the prior order or have been unknown at the time of the prior order. 100
"A material change in circumstances occurs when new facts are presented
that were unknown to the moving party at the time the decree was en-
tered." 01 Examples of material changes arising after a prior order include
frustration of visitation,102 serious drug abuse, physical abuse, neglect, or an
attempted suicide by the primary caregiver.O3
The modification must also be necessary to serve the best interests of
the children.' 04 In determining the best interests of the children, the court
should look to the statutory best interest factors. 05 Lack of stability is the
overriding concern in the determination. 106 The North Dakota Supreme
93. Hogue v. Hogue, 1998 ND 26, T 6, 574 N.W.2d 579, 582.
94. See Ackerman v. Ackerman, 1999 ND 135, % 10-11, 596 N.W.2d 332, 334 (relating the
factors the trial court used to determine child placement to the effect the factors had on the
parent's ability to care for the child).
95. Id.
96. Id. % 8-9.
97. Id.
98. Id. 911.
99. Mayo v. Mayo, 2000 ND 204, 14, 619 N.W.2d 631, 635.
100. Id.
101. Id. T 16, 619 N.W.2d at 635-36.
102. Anderson v. Resler, 2000 ND 183, 6, 618 N.W.2d 480, 483.
103. Wright v. Wright, 463 N.W.2d 654, 655 (N.D. 1990).
104. Mayo, 14, 619 N.W.2d at 635. Mayo had the burden of proving a change in custody
was required to serve the best interest of the children because he was the moving party. Id.; see
also N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.6(8) (2000).
105. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1) (listing the statutory best interest factors).
106. In re N.C.C., 2000 ND 129, 24, 612 N.W.2d 561, 567.
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Court considered these statutory factors in its review of the trial court's
decision in Mayo v. Mayo. 107
III. ANALYSIS
In Mayo, Justice Neumann penned the majority opinion, in which Chief
Justice VandeWalle, Justice Sandstrom, and Justice Kapsner concurred.10 8
The Supreme Court of North Dakota upheld the modification of child cus-
tody due substantially to parentification.109 The lone dissenting opinion, by
Justice Maring, stated that a mistake had been made and that common sense
would have decided the case differently."10
A. MAJORITY OPINION
The majority first analyzed the facts under the two-prong test used to
determine whether a change in child custody is warranted under North
Dakota Century Code section 14-09-06.6(6).11i To modify a court order
over two years old, the statute requires a material change in circumstances
that has arisen since or was unknown at the time of the prior order. 1l2 The
modification must also be necessary to serve the best interests of the
children. 113
First, the court looked for a material change in circumstances. 114 The
court found that Banjac's health problems, namely fibromyalgia and mi-
graine headaches, constituted a material change in circumstances because of
the resulting parentification of the oldest child.115 Banjac's illness was
present at the time of the divorce and, in fact, had improved since the
divorce,116 but the material change resulted from the oldest child beginning
the process of parentification.117
The court held that a material change in circumstance had occurred
after the divorce, not from Banjac's illness, but from the oldest child be-
coming parentified.118  The court stated that Banjac was unable to
107. 2000 ND 204, 619 N.W.2d 631.
108. Mayo, 25-38, 619 N.W.2d at 637-39.
109. ld. 35,619N.W.2d at 639.
110. Id. 54, 619 N.W.2d at 643 (Maring, J., dissenting).
111. Id. 14, 619 N.W.2d at 635.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. 16, 619 N.W.2d at 635-36.
115. Id. at 636.
116. Id. 55, 619 N.W.2d at 643 (Maring, J., dissenting).
117. Id. 16, 619 N.W.2d at 635-36.
118. Id.
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consistently care for her children's basic needs."19 The court noted that
Banjac's health problems would continue for the rest of her life.120 The
court found that these health problems were impairing the oldest child's
emotional health and would likely impair the middle child in the future.' 2'
Therefore, the court decided that continuing Banjac's physical custody and
control could result in substantial psychological damage to the two oldest
children, so a material change in circumstances had occurred.122
The Mayo court next analyzed the effects of parentification, defining it
as "the process in which a child loses his or her childhood after assuming
the responsibilities of a parent."123 According to the majority, the causes of
parentification can range from an occasional responsibility within the fam-
ily as the children grow, a child's feeling of responsibility for the conflict of
divorce, or a continuous and constant upbringing of younger siblings. 24
The effects of parentification can vary, but the common theme identi-
fied by the courts is anxiety of the child due to the increased and over-
whelming responsibility placed on the child.125 The court in Mayo found
the anxiety resulting from the role reversal in parentification caused sleep
loss, obsessive thoughts, perfectionism, over-extension, and depression due
to worrying about the younger siblings' well-being.126 The court found that
these symptoms could cause a problem in the development and emotional
health of the child, which could "manifest itself in adulthood in one of two
extreme ways."'127 The first way is by codependency, which results from
the child trying to compensate for the lack of care and nurturing he or she
received. 28 The second way is by caring for others to the extent of denying
personal emotional needs. 129
The court found a parentified child may suffer developmental and
emotional problems; however, "the greatest loss experienced by a...
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. 18, 619 N.W.2d at 636; see also discussion of parentification supra note 7.
124. Mayo v. Mayo, 2000 ND 204, 18, 619 N.W.2d 631, 636; In re Michael Ray T., 525
S.E.2d 315, 319 n.9 (W.Va. 1999); Ely v. Potter, No. J93-34, 1994 WL 1031125, at *4 (Va. Cir.
Ct. Apr. 6, 1994).
125. Mayo, 19, 619 N.W.2d at 636; In re Michael Ray T., 525 S.E.2d at 319 n.9; Ely, 1994
WL 1031125, at *4.
126. Mayo, 19-22, 619 N.W.2d at 636-37.
127. Id. 17-19, 619 N.W.2d at 636.
128. Id. 17. Codependency is used to describe people who use others as their sole source
of identity, value, and well-being because they are addicted to an unhealthy relationship with that
other person. Alcoholism, available at http://alcoholism.about.com/library/glos/bldef57.htm?iam
=dpile&terms=codependency (last visited Nov. 11, 2002).
129. Mayo, 17, 619 N.W.2d at 636.
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parentified child is the loss of their childhood, although the bitterness,
disappointment, depression, and other effects might not be realized until
later in their life."130 Even a nurturing adult relationship may not compen-
sate for parentification because the child does not know how to accept
affection; the child only knows how to give at the expense of his or her own
emotional needs. 13'
In incorporating its findings regarding parentification, the court in
Mayo found that endangering a child's physical or emotional health, or the
impairment of a child's emotional development through parentification,
represented a material change in circumstances, as did the possibility of
parentifying the second oldest child.132 Because the court found a material
change in circumstances, it then considered whether this change warranted
a change in custody. 133 The second prong of the two-part custody modifi-
cation test is whether a change in custody is in the best interest of the
child.134 The best interest of the child must be measured against the
stability of the child's present home and the current relationship with the
custodial parent.135
The court relied on the testimony of three expert psychologists.136 Dr.
Ascano, the neutral expert agreed upon by the parties, testified that after he
considered parentification, additional information about the parties, and the
children, his custody recommendation was no longer a "close call." 137
Considering the report of Dr. Timm, the psychologist for Mayo, who "con-
cluded that the weight of the evidence strongly favored granting permanent
physical custody to Mayo," Dr. Ascano changed his recommendation.138
Ultimately, the court agreed with both Dr. Ascano and Dr. Timm that the
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. 25, 619 N.W.2d at 637.
133. Id.
134. Id. 38, 619 N.W.2d at 639; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.6 (2000).
135. In re N.C.C., 2000 ND 129, 24, 612 N.W.2d 561, 567 (citing Blotske v. Leidholm,
487 N.W.2d 607, 610 (N.D. 1992)). After balancing the child's best interest with stability, the
court may find a change in custody is required. Myers v. Myers, 1999 ND 194, 10, 601 N.W.2d
264, 268. A close call "should be resolved in favor of continuing custody" where the child has
been living. Id. The ultimate determination of a child's best interest lies with the court, not with
any witness or expert. Mayo v. Mayo, 2000 ND 204, 28, 619 N.W.2d 631, 637 (citing Severson
v. Hansen, 529 N.W.2d 167, 169 (N.D. 1995)).
136. Mayo, 17, 619 N.W.2d at 636. The three psychologists were Drs. Rick Ascano,
Stephen Timm, and Thomas Will. Id. 10-11, 17, 619 N.W.2d at 635-36.
137. Id. 29-30, 619 N.W.2d at 638. Dr. Ascano did not make a custody recommendation
in his written report. Id. 29, 619 N.W.2d at 637.
138. Id. 29-30, 629 NW.2d at 637-38. Dr. Ascano's written report stated custody was too
close to call, however, after hearing Dr. Timm's testimony at trial, Dr. Ascano stated that custody
was no longer a close call and should be given to Mayo. Id.
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oldest child was becoming parentified.139 Dr. Will, Banjac's expert, did not
agree with Drs. Ascano and Timm in their diagnosis of parentification
because he felt that the diagnosis was flawed.140 However, Dr. Will agreed
with Dr. Timm and Dr. Ascano that therapy could correct the parentifi-
cation process without a change in physical custody.141 The court, finding
the oldest child was becoming parentified, ordered a change in physical
custody of all three children. 142
The North Dakota Supreme Court, in Hendrickson v. Hendrickson,143
stated that alternative remedies must be attempted before changing physical
custody of a child.144 However, the Mayo court stated that this only applies
in alienation and frustration of visitation cases where the problem is the
custodial parent's misbehavior, not an involuntary illness. 45 The court de-
clined to extend the rule to situations other than those that could be elimi-
nated by parental choice. 46 Even though all the expert psychologists in
Mayo testified that counseling could minimize or alleviate parentification,
the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld the change in custody, claiming
that Banjac rejected this option when she obtained her own expert, Dr.
Will. 147
139. Id.
140. Brief for Appellant at 16, Mayo v. Mayo, 2000 ND 204, 619 N.W.2d 631 (No.
20000032). Dr. Will listed several reasons for disagreeing with the parentification diagnosis: first,
the diagnosis was based on a ten minute portion of a thirty minute interview by Dr. Ascano with
Garnet; second, the cause of the parentification and the possibility it was due to Mayo was not
researched; third, the only option given to Banjac, a twenty-four hour nanny, was not scientifically
based and was counter-therapeutic and traumatic to the children; and finally, Dr. Ascano arrived at
his verbal custody recommendation without interviewing Banjac for her perspective on Garnet's
possibility of parentification. Id. at 16-17.
141. Mayo, 30-31, 619 N.W.2d at 638.
142. Id. 35, 619 N.W.2d at 639.
143. 1999 ND 37, 590 N.W.2d 220.
144. Hendrickson, 13, 590 N.W.2d at 224. In Hendrickson, the North Dakota Supreme
Court found the mother repeatedly interfered with the father's visitation of the children and
attempted to alienate them from their father. Id. The court stated that evidence of alienation and
frustration of visitation are relevant in determining whether a material change in circumstances
has occurred since the prior custody order. Id. The court also stated that other methods of
modifying the mother's behavior must be attempted before changing physical custody of the
children. Id.
145. Mayo, 32, 619 N.W.2d at 638.
146. Id. Parental choice means that the parent consciously chooses to disobey a court order.
Id. In this case, Banjac's illness was not a matter of parental choice because she could n6t choose
to eliminate the illness. Id.
147. Id. 7 33-35, 619 N.W.2d at 638-39. The trial court originally decided that if Banjac
hired a nanny who would be available twenty-four hours a day, she could retain custody. Id. This
was the only option given by the trial court that allowed Banjac to regain custody of the children.
Id. 8, 619 N.W.2d at 634. The court stated that Banjac rejected the nanny option when she hired
Dr. Will to rebut Dr. Ascano's opinion about the parentification of the oldest child. Id. 35, 619
N.W.2d at 639.
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The question arose whether the parentification was indeed caused by
Banjac having to lie down for one hour once a month or whether Mayo
leaving for work-related emergencies both day and night contributed to the
parentification of the oldest child.148 As to this issue, Dr. Ascano testified
that the oldest child was not anxious or unhappy about Mayo leaving for a
work-related emergency, and therefore, parentification was not present
when Mayo was called out on an emergency.149 The court accepted Dr.
Ascano's opinion and determined the best interests of the children required
a change in physical custody to eliminate parentification. 150
In summation, the court held that there had been a substantial change in
circumstances since the divorce due to the parentification of the oldest
child, and a change in custody was required in the best interests of the
children.15' It was not necessary to attempt other remedies before changing
physical custody because the cause of the parentification was not a parental
choice, even though all three experts agreed that therapy could have halted
the process of parentification. 152
B. JUSTICE MARING'S DISSENT
In her dissent, Justice Maring disagreed with the majority's conclusion
that there was a substantial change in circumstances since the parties
divorced in 1995.153 In Justice Maring's opinion, the trial court did not
afford the stability of the children's home sufficient weight in evaluating
their best interests, especially because other remedies, like counseling,
existed.154 Justice Maring reasoned that a material change of circumstances
was required before a transfer of custody could be made in the best interests
of the children.155 However, she further stated that not every change of
circumstance justified a change in custody. 56
The material change in circumstances found by the trial court and
affirmed by the majority was the oldest child becoming parentified, not by
Banjac's choice, but because of health problems that existed prior to the
1995 divorce.157 Banjac was awarded custody of the children by stipulation
148. Id. 34, 619 N.W.2d at 638-39.
149. Id. at 639.
150. Id. 35.
151. Id. 38.
152. Id. 35.
153. Id. 43, 619 N.W.2d at 640 (Maring, J., dissenting).
154. Id.
155. Id. 44.
156. Id. (citing Ludwig v. Burchill, 481 N.W.2d 464,469 (N.D. 1992)).
157. Id. 45.
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of the parties at that time.158 Justice Maring noted that at the time of the
stipulation, Banjac had more frequent migraines that required her to lie
down more often, and Mayo was aware of Banjac's condition. 59 It was not
until Banjac remarried and planned to move to Minnesota, stated Justice
Maring, that Mayo desired a change in custody, even though Banjac's
health had improved with medication. 160
Justice Maring stated, "The alleged parentification occurs when Banjac
is forced to lie down for one hour each month" due to fibromyalgia and
migraine headaches.I61 She noted that during this one hour, the oldest child
was given the responsibility of babysitting her younger siblings. 162 "This
increase in responsibility has allegedly caused the oldest child to assume a
care-taking role."' 163
North Dakota law does not stipulate an age at which children can be
left alone or care for younger children.1 64 The North Dakota Department of
Human Services provides guidelines for parents, which state that children
who are age nine can be left home alone, unsupervised, for not more than
two hours in the day; however, children ages ten and eleven may be left
home alone for longer periods.165 At age twelve, a child is deemed able to
babysit for reasonable lengths of time.166 According to these guidelines,
Banjac made a childcare choice that was within the acceptable state-sanc-
tioned guidelines for parents, and Mayo may have made a choice outside
these guidelines by leaving the children for extended periods of time over
sleeping hours. 67 Justice Maring considered these guidelines and their
application to the family unit in her dissent. 68
158. Id. 55, 619 N.W.2d at 643.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. 45, 619 N.W.2d at 640.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. CHILD PROTECTION SERV., N.D. DEP'T. OF HUMAN SERV., HOME ALONE: IS YOUR
CHILD READY? (200 1).
165. Id. The North Dakota Department of Human Services publishes a pamphlet that pro-
vides guidelines for parents to help them decide if their child is ready to be left home alone or care
for younger children. Id.
166. Id. It is recommended that a child complete an approved training course before baby-
sitting. Id. Other factors to consider besides age are: the maturity of the child; physical, mental,
and emotional limitations and health of the child; length of time; time of day or night; location and
environment; frequency; and the accessibility of a parent. Id.
167. Mayo v. Mayo, 2000 ND 204, 45-47, 619 N.W.2d 631, 640-41 (Maring J.,
dissenting).
168. See id. 45, 619 NW.2d at 640 (discussing the commonality of older siblings watching
younger siblings for short periods of time).
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Justice Maring noted that, historically, older children have cared for
younger children, especially in large families.169 She determined this was
not a new or unique role for children, but more like a chore, similar to
cleaning the house, and is a way that children contribute to the family.170
She stated that the increased responsibility is not only part of growing-up,
but is usually a beneficial and common life experience.171 Watching sib-
lings for one hour once a month while a parent remains available, according
to Justice Maring, is within the guidelines and is historically accepted by
society. 172
Justice Maring stated, "It is ... the court's conclusion the oldest child
is in the process of becoming parentified because of her mother's health
problems. Yet, the evidence shows the oldest child assumes the role of
caretaker while in the custody of her father, Mayo."' 73 Justice Maring
noted that Mayo was unexpectedly called away for emergencies at the
hospital, both day and night, leaving the oldest child to care for the younger
children.174 She stated there was an issue of whether the parentification was
being caused by Mayo as well as Banjac.175 From Justice Maring's per-
spective, the court overlooked Dr. Will's testimony by not giving it the
weight she would have afforded it.176 Dr. Will testified that extensive
testing would be required to determine which parent was causing the paren-
tification.177 The trial court decided Dr. Will's testimony was not reliable
because he based his conclusions on tests like the Rorschach test, 178 how-
ever, the majority opinion did not address this issue in its decision. 179 Jus-
tice Maring pointed out that the Rorschach test has been routinely used and
interpreted by psychologists to form diagnosis and has been accepted in
court proceedings for many years.180
169. Id.
170. Id. at 640-41.
171. Id.
172. Id. 46, 619 N.W.2d at 641.
173. Id. 47.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. 48.
177. Id.
178. The Rorschach test was developed by Hermann Rorschach, a Swiss psychiatrist who
lived from 1884 to 1922. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1244 (26th ed. 1995). The test is
characterized by the patient revealing his attitudes, emotions, and personality by responding to a
series of ten inkblot pictures. Id. at 1427.
179. Mayo v. Mayo, 2000 ND 204, 49, 619 N.W.2d 631, 641.
180. See id. (mentioning State v. Iverson, 225 N.W.2d 48, 54 (N.D. 1974) and Bender v.
North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 139 N.W.2d 150, 155 (N.D. 1965) as examples
of when the Rorschach test was used as a basis for a psychological determination in North
Dakota).
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Justice Maring stated that Dr. Ascano testified he did not have enough
information to determine which parent was the cause of the parentifica-
tion.1 81 Additionally, Dr. Will concluded that it was equally likely that
Mayo contributed to the parentification process since he also required the
oldest child to take care of her siblings when he had an emergency at the
hospital.182 Even though the court acknowledged Mayo would still be
called away to the hospital for emergencies, Justice Maring disagreed when
the court found Mayo was not contributing to the parentification.l8 3 As
support for her opinion, Justice Maring noted that Mayo had previously and
unsuccessfully attempted to reduce his work hours, and this was an issue
Banjac testified to concerning their divorce in 1995.184 During visitation
with the children, Mayo left them with caregivers because he continued to
work long hours at the hospital.185 "Assuming the process of parentifica-
tion ha[d] begun in the oldest child," Justice Maring noted that the record
indicated the cause was not clear and both parties contributed to it. 186
Justice Maring emphasized this case was a modification proceeding,
not an original custody order, and in a modification proceeding, a child's
stability is "the most compelling factor." 87 She stated that the court pre-
sumes the child is better off with the custodial parent, and to support
stability, a close call is resolved by leaving the child with the custodial
parent, not bouncing the child from parent to parent when the circumstances
change slightly. 188
Dr. Ascano testified at trial that the oldest child suffered from "antici-
patory anxiety."1 89 Dr. Ascano continued by stating if Banjac remained the
181. Id. 50, 619 N.W.2d at 640-41.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 641-42.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 642.
186. Id.
187. Id. 51 (citing Blotske v. Leidholm, 487 N.W.2d 607, 610 (N.D. 1992)). In an original
custody order, the trial court determines "the single issue of the best interest of the child." Starke
v. Starke, 458 N.W.2d 758, 760 (N.D. 1990). In a custody modification proceeding, the criteria in
North Dakota Century Code section 14-09-06.6(6) are considered. Id. In order to promote
stability, "a prior decree should not be modified without a showing of a significant need for doing
so." Id. (citing Wright v. Wright, 431 N.W.2d 301 (N.D. 1988)). Justice Maring stated that had
the Mayo decision been an original custody order, the trial court's finding would have been within
its authority, but it was not an original custody order. Mayo v. Mayo, 2000 ND 204, 51, 619
N.W.2d 631, 642 (citing Blotske, 487 N.W.2d at 611).
188. Mayo, 51, 619 N.W.2d at 642 (Maring J., dissenting). "A child is presumed to be
better off with the custodial parent, and close calls should be resolved in favor of continuing
custody." Myers v. Myers, 1999 ND 194, 10, 601 N.W.2d 264, 268 (quoting Hagel v. Hagel,
512 N.W.2d 465(N.D. 1994)).
189. Mayo, 52, 619 N.W.2d at 642; see also discussion of anticipatory anxiety supra note
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custodial parent of the oldest child, there was "a substantial likelihood of
significant psychological harm" to the child.190 According to Justice Mar-
ing, the court then found parentification to be an irremediable condition that
would cause a substantial amount of harm to the oldest child's emotional
health.191 However, Justice Maring pointed out Dr. Ascano's testimony
was not that "the oldest child will suffer harm in the future," only that she
would likely suffer harm in the future.192 She noted that the court further
indicated there was no alternate remedy because Banjac rejected the nanny
option by requesting the chance to rebut Dr. Ascano's findings.193 Ac-
cording to Justice Maring, Banjac's action and rebuttal of Dr. Ascano's
conclusion that the oldest child was parentified in no way altered the fact
that remedies other than a change of custody existed.194
Justice Maring also disagreed with the majority as to whether the rule
from alienation and frustration of visitation cases (that other remedies
should be exhausted before custody is changed) should apply to this case.195
The majority did not require any other options to be considered before a
change in custody was ordered because the misbehavior of a parent can be
eliminated, or at least controlled, but "Banjac's illness and the resulting
parentification of the oldest child [could] not similarly be controlled."' 96
Dr. Ascano testified that the parentification process could be eliminated
through therapy or by arranging for a nanny to provide for the children's
care when Banjac becomes ill.197 Justice Maring stated one of these two
options should have been attempted before "uprooting" the children from
their home and lifelong caretaker. 98 According to Justice Maring, "'judges
bring to each case their common sense, ordinary experience, and observa-
tion of human affairs.' Here, common sense and experience dictates this
child is not emotionally endangered and this is a situation that could be
remedied, if necessary, by the hiring of a nanny and some therapy."199 For
the above reasons, Justice Maring dissented.2 00
190. Mayo, 52, 619 N.W.2d at 642.
191. Id.
192. id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. 53; see also Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 1999 ND 37, 13, 590 N.W.2d 220,
223-24 (recognizing other methods to remedy a child custody dispute must be exhausted before
changing custody).
196. See Mayo v. Mayo, 2000 ND 204, 53, 619 N.W.2d 631, 643 (Maring, J., dissenting)
(discussing the majority opinion).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. 54 (citing Heitkamp v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 208 (N.D. 1991)).
200. Id. 56.
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IV. IMPACT
Between 1988 and 1998, the average number of marriages per year in
the state of North Dakota was 4681.201 The average number of births per
year over that ten-year period was nearly double that number at 8692.202
During that same period, an average of 2233 married couples divorced or
had their marriages annulled each year. 203 With such a high rate of divorce,
the courts are deciding child custody issues on a regular basis.204 The North
Dakota Supreme Court heard twenty-one cases dealing with the best
interest of a child from October 2000 through October 2001.205
Mayo dealt not only with the best interest of the child, but it also
focused on the health of the parent.2 06 Statistically, an estimated three to six
million people suffer from fibromyalgia. 207 Considering additional factors
such as migraine headaches and other diseases that may cause a person to
lie down for one hour once a month, the impact of Mayo on divorce cases
involving child custody and placement is potentially enormous. 208
The North Dakota Supreme Court uses the statutory best interest fac-
tors in North Dakota Century Code section 14-09-06.2(1) to determine the
best interest of a child in custody decisions. 209 By considering parentifica-
tion as a factor in deciding child custody cases like Mayo, the court has
arguably added parentification to the best interest criteria.2 10 This addition
is easily falls under the catchall factor of section 14-09-06.2(l)(m) which
201. See North Dakota Marriage Data, available at http://www.vitalnd.com (last visited Nov.
11, 2002) (listing marriage statistics for the state of North Dakota by county from 1982 to 1998).
202. See id. (listing birth data according to the county where the license was issued).
203. See id. (listing divorce and annulment statistics).
204. See id. (listing the divorce rates and number of divorces from 1988 through 1998); see
also Vital Statistics Report, available at http://www.divorcereform.org/94staterates.html
(last visited Nov. 11, 2002) (listing North Dakota as having 2201 divorces in 1994, which is 3.4
divorces for every 1000 people living in the state).
205. A search for "best interest" and "child" was run on LEXIS with an October 2000 to
October 2001 date restriction, which resulted in twenty-one North Dakota Supreme Court cases
being identified as containing those terms. See generally, e.g., Selzler v. Selzler, 2001 ND 138,
631 N.W.2d 564; In re A.B., 2001 ND 111, 627 N.W.2d 776; In re C.R.C., 2001 ND 83, 625
N.W.2d 533.
206. Mayo v. Mayo, 2000 ND 204, 51, 619 N.W.2d 631, 642 (Maring, J., dissenting).
207. Fibromyalgia on nih, supra note 5.
208. Mayo, 16, 619 N.W.2d at 636.
209. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1) (2000). North Dakota Century Code section 14-
09-06.2(1) is the statutory provision that codifies the relevant considerations North Dakota trial
courts have used to decide child custody in divorce disputes throughout the past decade. Lapp v.
Lapp, 293 N.W.2d 121, 125-26 (N.D. 1980).
210. See Mayo, 30, 619 N.W.2d at 638 (stating that the trial court gave the appropriate
weight to each factor when it weighed the stability factor against the testimony of Dr. Ascano).
Dr. Ascano testified counseling and having a nanny available for childcare when the mother had
to lie down could minimize the impact of parentification on the oldest child. Id. 7, 619 N.W.2d
at 634.
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includes "any other factors considered by the court to be relevant to a
particular child custody dispute." 21u
In modification of custody proceedings, the child's stability has his-
torically been the most compelling of the best interest factors considered by
the court.212 The Mayo decision seemingly infers that parentification has
surpassed the stability of a child as the overriding consideration when
deciding the best interest of the child by finding that the parentification in
Mayo outweighed the custodial stability factor.213
In the North Dakota Supreme Court's first decision on parentification,
Mayo, the court defined parentification as the process whereby "a child
loses his or her childhood after assuming the responsibilities of a parent." 214
Other states, like Virginia, have defined parentification as an emotional
process or the result of constant and continual responsibility, not merely
watching a sibling for one hour once a month.215 In West Virginia, paren-
tification has been defined as the routine or habitual babysitting of a
younger sibling.216
Parentification does not have a uniformly accepted definition in the
court system or in psychological reference materials. 217 The states that
have addressed the issue of parentification have not only given the evidence
significantly different weighted value, but have failed to compose a uniform
definition. 2 18 Therefore, the court and the state determine the meaning of
parentification because it does not have a uniformly accepted definition.2 19
211. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(l)(m).
212. See Mayo, 51, 619 N.W.2d at 642 (Maring, J., dissenting) (citing Lovin v. Lovin, 1997
ND 55, 17, 561 N.W.2d 612, 615, as stating that "maintaining the child's stability with the
custodial parent is the most compelling factor").
213. See id. 30, 619 N.W.2d at 638 (deciding parentification outweighed custodial
stability).
214. Id. 18, 619 N.W.2d at 636.
215. See Ely v. Potter, No. J93-34, 1994 WL 1031125, at *4 (Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 6, 1994)
(defining parentification as the result of distress caused by the conflict between divorcing parents
because of feeling responsible for the divorce).
216. In re Michael Ray T., 525 S.E.2d 315, 319 n.9 (W. Va. 1999) (defining parentification
as resulting when a child is "routinely permitted to assume responsibilities which appropriately
belong to parents").
217. See Mayo, 18, 619 N.W.2d at 636 (stating that parentification is not a diagnosis in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders); see also parentification defined supra
note 7.
218. See supra Part lI.A-B.
219. Compare Mayo, 18, 619 N.W.2d at 636, with In re Michael Ray T., 525 S.E.2d at 319
n.9, and Ely, 1994 WL 1031125, at *4 (each defining parentification differently).
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V. CONCLUSION
In Mayo, the court held that the onset of parentification in a child is a
material change in circumstance.220 Upon weighing the statutory best inter-
est factors, the court held the psychological harm to a child due to parentifi-
cation outweighed the custodial stability factor. 22' This in turn justified a
change in custody designed to eliminate the parentification in the best inter-
est of the child.222 The court found that given the circumstances, there was
no need to consider other remedies before ordering a change in custody. 223
Bonnie L. Christner
220. Mayo, 25, 619 N.W.2d at 637.
221. Id. 30, 619 N.W.2d at 638.
222. Id. 35, 619 N.W.2d at 639.
223. Id. 32, 619 N.W.2d at 638.
2002]

